From Freedom, Reason, Tolerance, Right Behavior and Salvation by Character: Toward a Liberal Christian Concept of Man and the World

George Huntston Williams

Williams, a noted historian and liberal scholar, began his teaching career at Starr King School, then moved east in 1949 to become Harvard Divinity School’s Acting Dean and later Hollis Professor of Divinity.

“When invited to be the honored scholar of the liberal religious community during the Collegium of the academic year 1978–79, during the course of which year I would turn sixty-five, I was encouraged to reflect on the three marks of liberal religion, set forth by Earl Morse Wilbur (1866–1959) in his two-volume magnum opus, A History of Unitarianism.1 If I were a professor of the comparative study of religion, I might have been asked to reconsider the renowned five points of the American Unitarian James Freeman Clarke (1810–80), whose interfaith and Christian ecumenical spirit renowned in pulpit, practice, and publications, was sustained by a muted Transcendentalism.” -- G.H. Williams (1914-2000)

I. INTRODUCTION: FIVE MARKS OF LIBERAL RELIGION

When invited to be the honored scholar of the liberal religious community during the Collegium of the academic year 1978/79, during the course of which year I would turn sixty-five, I was encouraged to reflect on the three marks of liberal religion, set forth by Earl Morse Wilbur (1866-1959) in his two-volume magnum opus, A History of Unitarianism.(1) If I were a professor of the compara-
tive study of religion, I might have been asked to reconsider the renowned five points of the Ameri-
can Unitarian James Freeman Clarke (1810-80), whose interfaith and Christian ecumenical spirit
renowned in pulpit, practice, and publications, was sustained by a muted Transcendentalism. Those
five points were “The Fatherhood of God, the Brotherhood of Man, the Leadership of Jesus, Salva-
tion by Character, and the Progress of Mankind onward and upward forever.”(2) These points, being
more substantive than procedural as with Wilbur’s three marks, would actually have served me in the
historical and constructive effort I herewith undertake. But the importance of Wilbur’s historiograph-
ical image of liberal religion obliges me to take his marks as a starting point; I shall have extrapo-
lated from him two more for my purposes.

Last year you similarly honored Charles Hartshorne. John F. Hayward in his perceptive “The Sacred
World: Toward a Process Theology” called Alfred North Whitehead (d. 1947) the “grandfather of
process thought” and Hartshorne “his major living intellectual son.”(3) Now I am not the intellectual
son of Wilbur, nor his grandson, in the sense of having been a student or a student of a student of his,
but I knew him well, and I am, in part impelled by a sense of filio-pietistic duty, the literary executor
in my own way of portions of his literary remains.(4)

In what follows concerning Earl Morse Wilbur, who has posthumously influenced me, I make refer-
ces in footnotes not only to other persons(5) who have influenced me but also to my own writings,
even though sometimes only tangentially related to my presentation.(6) At points my bibliography
might look more like the facile essays of a generalist than the quarryings of a specialist. But I do
hold that Church, as distinguished from ecclesiastical, history(7) is a discipline under the general ru-
bric of Divinity whenever even the specialist at least tries to place his or her specialties in the largest
context — the community of faith, yes, even within the human condition. Thus the presentation that
follows is a literary polyphony, a special genre of composition, in that while the tenor of my remarks
is about Wilbur’s five themes, in the bass, as it were, the reader should know that inaudible, but leg-
able as footnotes, are the titles of my own works related to the themes and occasional remarks as to
their original inspiration or occasion.

In the introduction to his magnum opus, Dr. Wilbur declared that his work was intended “to present
not so much the history of a particular sect or form of Christian doctrine, as to consider broadly the
development of a movement fundamentally characterized instead by its steadfast and increasing de-
votion to these three leading principles: first, complete mental freedom in religion rather than bond-
age to creeds or confessions; second, the unrestricted use of reason in religion, rather than reliance
upon external authority or past tradition; third, generous tolerance of differing religious views and
usages rather than insistence upon uniformity in doctrine, worship or polity.”(8)
Dr. Wilbur was the founder of the Starr King School for the Ministry in 1904 (under the name of the Pacific Unitarian School) on the borders of the University of California at Berkeley. He was the school’s dean from 1904 to 1910 and its president from 1911 to his retirement. He always insisted, in a long since routinized, quiet renunciation of any claim to having been a professional historian, that he was the president of the School but that, as to his academic chair, he had always been the professor of applied theology, notably of homiletics. It is surely true that he was never trained in advanced seminars as an historian at Harvard, where he received his S.T.B. in 1890.(9) Still, Wilbur became the magistral twentieth-century historian of the whole liberal Christian movement for Europe no less than for America.

After he published Our Unitarian Heritage, which was rather more advanced than he realized for use in Sunday Schools, he moved to finalize his matured work on a Guggenheim Fellowship in Poland. But Wilbur then faced the first of two major blows in life,(10) the death of his only son who died because of medical casualness while he was a student in Stanford University. (Only Mrs. Dorothea Eliot Wilbur, a cousin of T.S. Eliot, returned to attend to her stricken daughter and to the aftermath of sudden grief.) Dr. Wilbur dedicated in due course the magnum opus to their only son, “in whose life...were finely exemplified the principles of/Freedom in thought/Reason in conduct and/Tolerance in judgment...” Surely the enshrinement of Dr. Wilbur’s three liberal principles in the poignant dedication of nearly a life’s work betokens the more than rhetorical symmetry of the triad he had evolved as the historian of liberal Christianity. Yet these principles are strangely non-functional, for the most part, in Dr. Wilbur’s two volumes.

For example, a body in some ways more liberal than early American Unitarianism and approximately fifty years older than it in roughly the same areas, American Universalism, is scarcely touched upon by him.(11) Liberal tendencies in mainline Protestantism Dr. Wilbur ignored, though he professed not to be writing denominational history. So far as Congregationalism went, in which tradition he was brought up, it had been following its schismatic sibling, theologically and in terms of social justice, with only a bit more than a long generation gap between them. The Congregationalists recapitulated many of the positions reached by most Unitarians from thirty to forty years earlier. Yet Congregationalism appears in his work only as the often unfair antagonist.(12)

As for freedom of religious innovation and separation from political coercion, the main body of Unitarians of Transylvania, with Dr. George Biandrata’s influence in the Transylvanian court, surely experienced coercion to forestall the spread of the innovations of Bishop of Superintendent Francis David. David’s innovations led to his house arrest and eventual death in prison in 1579. The house guest and theologian, whom George Biandrata had brought to convince David of his errors, not simply of his political imprudence, was Faustus Socinus from Siena, Florence, and Basel.(13)
Socinus should be exonerated from the charge, circulating against him in his own time from Unitarians sympathetic with David, that the former Sienese was instrumental in the coercive aspects of the encounter; but as to the principle of reason, supposedly the ideal arbiter in the debates in David’s house, it should be said forthrightly that Socinus both there and later in Poland was, if a rationalist, a bigoted and esoteric rationalist.

It was his view, based on a peculiar reading of three passages in John, that after the baptism of Jesus by John, Christ in the wilderness ascended to God the Father and learned from him directly what remained valid in the Old Covenant, what in it had to be modified, and what new precepts he should bring down as the Gospel of the New Covenant. Although like Desiderius Erasmus against Martin Luther, Socinus had come to believe in the freedom of the will unto salvation, nevertheless, so decisive for Socinus was this rather contrived postulate of a pre-Ascension gnosis of Christ, the last prophet, that he held that only those who would freely follow these modified laws and new precepts nearly to perfection would rise from the grave at the Second Advent of Christ to experience the resurrection of the body and the reanimation of it to enjoy life eternal with Christ. In the meantime Socinus and some Polish Socinians with him believed not only that Adam was created mortal — he merely would have lived longer than he did if he had obeyed God in the Garden — but also that the souls of the good and the wicked alike die with the body; and that the punishment of the wicked would be merely the failure to be resurrected. Socinus also conjectured that the wicked and those who had never heard the Gospel in the New World would be resurrected but only for the twinkling of an eye to see what they had missed for having been wicked or for failing to come in contact with Christian missionaries.(14) If the Calvinists had limited Atonement, Socinians had limited resurrection and therefore salvation. But whatever the merits of the eschatological system, one can scarcely see in the exegesis and hermeneutic of Socinus an “unrestricted use of reason.” One finds instead a highly contrived use of the rational processes against much that was fairly clear in Scripture, for example, the injunction in Matthew 28:19 to baptize. Although Socinus became the major spokesman of the Polish Brethren from 1580 to his death in 1604, he refused to be rebaptised by believers’ immersion, as had become the local Unitarian practice, or to countenance any kind of baptism. Therefore he could not be admitted to communion, to which he attached importance as the only sacrament ordained by Christ.(15)

And still further, as for the idea of freedom, it is not incidental that the Unitarian churches of both Transylvania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were synodal or presbyterian in polity. Moreover in church meeting and synod the noble patrons, who owned the churches in which they all worshipped, were virtually as powerful, relative to the ministers and lay faithful, as Catholic bishops whose spiritual and temporal authority the powerful Protestant patrons had resented and for which reason they had in fact espoused Calvinism or somewhat later (1565) Unitarianism. Scarcely
a book or tract could be published without approval by the synod of ministers and elders including the patrons; and some books went through general debate and intense revision by elected commissioners through several general synods before being published — a veritable collective Unitarian imprimatur!

Yet, for all this and so much more, Dr. Wilbur was right in descrying a little more freedom, a little more use of reason, and surely more toleration of other forms of Christianity and, more rarely, other forms of religion, than in the groupings he left out of his account. But his magnum opus does, in fact, follow in the tradition of confessional or denominational history. Some liberal Christians he sets before us did wish to return to Scripture alone. The Polish Brethren returned also to the Apostle’s Creed, which they regarded, with Erasmus, as summing up the essence of Scripture acceptably about the time of the Council and (first) Creed of Nicaea in 325. Thus though Wilbur’s large study displays enormous attention to printed and manuscript sources and to monographic literature in many languages, mastered and critically assessed, yet in a tradition that goes back to Stanislas Lubieniecki, Historia (Amsterdam, 1685), Friedrich Trechsel, Die protestantischen Antitrinitarier, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1838/44), and Otto Fock, Der Sociniamismus, 2 vols. (Kiel, 1847), Wilbur did not significantly go beyond the channels of denominational, if not confessional, history. Despite his personal conviction and, I think, sustaining insight as to the three great marks of liberal Christianity, Wilbur primarily widened and modernized the roadbeds of earlier heresiology or friendly denominational historiography.

It is notable that this compulsively erudite scholar, in the paragraph immediately preceding the one in which our initial quotation is embedded, wrote perceptively:

Had the chief doctrinal controversies in the early Church happened to be waged over the doctrine of man rather than the doctrine of God and Christ, the separation [of the liberal religious movement] from the main stream of Christian tradition might have come about on quite other grounds... In the few and brief moments when this movement has been suffered to exist free from persecution... doctrine has almost invariably retired into the background, and the emphasis has by preference been laid on conduct and character. Its primary psychological character is thus best described in terms not of the intellect or of the emotions, but of the will.

Then follows our earlier quotation of the triadic themes. Dr. Wilbur was thus ill at ease with doctrinal formulation, the work indeed of the intellect, while somewhat inconsistently he made unrestricted use of reason, one of his triad. When in the foregoing quotation he spoke of few and brief periods when conduct and character rather than doctrine were to the fore, he expressly had in mind Pelagius
and undoubtedly also Erasmus and the noncommittal supernatural rationalists and Arminians of New England, forerunners of American Unitarianism and Universalism.

But why, if reason is so important in religion, was it not incumbent upon reason to formulate as adequately as possible a teaching about man, that is, an anthropology? Surely any such formulation would be subject to change over the years, yet it could be a point of common reference. (Dr. Wilbur is quite right that early Christian Fathers might just as well have divided over the doctrine of man; for in fact, Christianity did bring into the world a different understanding of the individual person and of human collectivity: the Church and mankind.) If by way of introducing the triad of freedom, reason, and tolerance, Wilbur did give attention to still another characteristic emphasis of liberal religion, namely, a concern for human behavior, then we have almost from his pen a fourth mark of liberal Christianity. With respect to that fourth mark, we, as he, must finally say something about the ultimate purpose of freedom, of the right use of reason, of tolerance of other Christian confessions, and eventually of tolerance of religions other than Christian. We thus include among the marks what is central to any religion: the wholeness, the health, the salvation of the individual and the community of faith and ultimately of mankind and the whole of creation.

Dr. Wilbur was himself no only a Christocentric theist, a Vermont-born Congregationalist who quietly moved over at Harvard Divinity School to the then still regnant Unitarianism, but he also believed in immortality stemming from “uprightness of character,” the final phrase in his dedication of his work to his “dearly beloved Son... too soon cut short.” His son followed the precepts of Christ and the New Testament as taught by his father. Dr. Wilbur was, in fact, in benign behavior and belief, except for his probable belief in universal rather than limited immortality, the last Socinian. His extraordinary countenance in a painting, which looks down upon one in the dining room of his daughter, Mrs. Elizabeth Wilbur Nelson, is still a most extraordinary presence, like that felt by the Socinians in the presence of Christ their heavenly King and eternal High Priest at their solemnly joyful eucharists.

Thus we add to Dr. Wilbur’s triad of liberal attributes or traits not only behavior of ethical concern but also a concern for salvation in the now and in the hereafter. He took this last concern for granted throughout the book. And since salvation is central and generic to all religions, to make the rubric distinctively a liberal formulation, we shall use a late American Unitarian phrase, that to none today would seem adequate because of its wholly individualistic and over optimistic view of man: “salvation by character.”
We have thus extracted from Unitarian-Socinian Earl Morse Wilbur five marks of liberal Christianity, along with an incidental critique of their limited use by him: freedom, reason, toleration, right behavior, and salvation by character.

And now keeping as our topic this quintessential liberal religion, I now embark upon a sketch that will carry these five themes backward and forward in general Church history, mindful of what American Universalists did for their formative principle of universal salvation, relatively earlier than did American Unitarians. (I am thinking here of Hosea Ballou’s Ancient History of Universalism [Boston, 1829], which went down to the Ecumenical Council of 553 where universalist Origen was condemned, and included appendices on the Reformation Era; and of Thomas Whittemore’s History of Modern Universalism [Boston, 1860].)

II. THE FIVE MARKS IN GENERAL CHURCH HISTORY

In seeking for historic points of reference in our comprehensive liberal Christian pentarchy, governing the doctrine of man and salvation subject, of course, to ever renewed revision, we do well not to go first to Origen or to Arius, for we would surely have problems there, but rather to what was new about the presuppositions as to the nature of man in the New Testament Epoch, then in the Ancient Church, and finally in the eras and major areas of Christian development thereafter in general and the liberal impulse therein in particular. What follows, then, are some of my own observations and convictions about Church history and Christian theology under the five rubrics of Dr. Wilbur now applied to more than the some four hundred and twenty years of Unitarian history, to which he limited himself.

A. FREEDOM

Freedom has both a personal and a societal sense. Eschatologically minded Jews made a free decision to submit themselves to the immersion of repentance at the hands of John, a new kind of prophetic figure of vaguely Essene background. The village followers of John formed voluntary associations, largely independent of the whole apparatus of the Temple cultus, in ways different from the Essenes themselves at their pacifistic retreat at Qumran who prepared, with their Manual of Discipline, for the decisive War of the Lord. Jesus recruited for his still different following from among ordinary people, most of them too busy to heed all the laws of the established priestly religion, and from even the outcasts of Jewish society itself; tax-collectors for the Romans, the halt, the blind, lepers, beggars, prostitutes, the woman with a continuous issue of blood, even a Samaritan woman, Whatever New Testament Criticism does with this or that passage, it cannot remove the cumulative
evidence that Jesus awakened in many a sense of inner liberation to seek him, if they had no already been sought out by him. They were freed from the bondage of the conventions of class, religious probity, and finally ethnicity.

If common folk could understand themselves as free, so in later ages, as Christianity spread beyond Judaism, could trained philosophers. Over against several traditions, religious and philosophical, of Greece they knew in Christ as Lord above the lords that they were free from the principalities and powers, from the stars and their effluence in human affairs, from fate itself. The good news was twofold: that believers in Christ were not dependent upon these cosmic and occult powers and that, by heeding Christ and his apostles they would gain wholeness in all its senses in this life and the next. Paul in Phil. 2:12 said: “Work out your salvation in fear and trembling,” that is, with a sense of accountability based on personal freedom. This was an injunction much closer to mainline Christian thinking of his time about freedom than many other passages where Paul had begun to spiritualize the doctrine of a Chosen and Called Nation and convert it into what Augustine would further refine as the metahistorical election of a few. In his reaction from his phase of espousal of Manichaeism and in his controversy with Pelagianism, Augustine left his predestinarian imprint on the doctrine of man in the Western mind into modern times.

The fateful legacy of Augustine on predestination provided for only a formal, non-functional freedom unto salvation (after 397), involving at length even the possibility of eternal decrees of both reprobation and predestination to salvation before Adam sinned. This notion endured in western medieval theology until a kind of semi-Augustinianism or even a neo-Pelagianism reasserted itself in late medieval eclectic nominalism. This, in turn, was swept aside by the Austin friar and principal theologian of classical Protestantism or the magisterial Reformation, Martin Luther. Luther was the radical innovator, and classical Protestantism in general would in most countries take a century or more to outgrow what Luther and especially John Calvin presumed to be normative Pauline doctrine. Said Luther: “Free will is a fabrication, a mere turn of phrase without reality.”

Only the proponents of the radical reformation,(16) including the forerunners of Faustus Socinus and the Unitarians, appealing to Greek Fathers no less than to Erasmus, revived the early Christian and medieval conviction as to the relative freedom of the will unto salvation. The Catholics at Trent by 1549 had sufficiently rallied from the Lutheran innovation to declare in canon 5 on justification: “If anyone says that since Adam’s sin the free will... is lost... or... only a name without reality, let him be anathema.” How interesting that the left and right wings of the Reformation upheaval should have been alike in this, most of all. Aware of the mysteries of supernatural calling and grace, Radicals and
Catholics were alike aware of the need of the free or the freed will to follow the path that would lead to grace and salvation.

Embedded though free will may be for us today in the inexorabilities of what we recognize as the genetic code, environmental factors, and the programmed patterns of sociobiology; still, with Servetus and Socinus, Elhanan Winchester and Earl M. Wilbur, we have been much closer to the early Christians, the Greek and Byzantine Fathers and theologians, and the late medieval Latin Christians who often contrived to escape the strictures of Augustine, than were Luther or Calvin. The classical reformers were the innovators for good or ill!

The whole of the Orthodox Church(17) and the Eastern schismatic and eventually ethnic churches preserve the earliest Christian conviction about the freedom in Christ and through Christ. To be sure the Third Ecumenical Council of Ephesus in 431, as a theological courtesy to the West, condemned Pelagianism (without, however, fully going into what the historic Pelagius held and what Augustine had argued against him and his followers). Nevertheless, it is a useful generalization of Church history to say that one of some half-dozen fundamental differences between Orthodoxy and Latin Christendom, Roman and classical Protestant, is that the East never really accepted Augustine and, with due respect to Paul’s utterances on election, persevered in the early Christian view that man is in some measure liberated by Christ to work out, with God’s grace, his own salvation in fear and trembling.

The Apologists of the second century, the Old Catholic fathers, and the Post-Nicene Fathers have left impressive witness to their opposition against all forms of the coercion of conscience.(18) Christianity, however, became increasingly coercive in the main line of development, climaxing in the Crusades and the medieval Inquisition, which later evolved into the papally sanctioned Spanish Inquisition as well as that of Rome itself instituted in 1542. It is of interest that the Eastern Orthodox Church which upheld freedom of the will over against the extremes of Augustinianism and classical Protestantism with respect to salvation should have proved, right into the Soviet period, that Orthodoxy readily lends itself to the coercive mission of the state, even that runby the Communists. Eastern Orthodoxy suppressed its own conscientious dissenters from the Patriarchal policy.(19)

As to freedom from bondage to creeds, as stressed in Wilbur’s basic triad of traits, there have been no differences between East and West, except that the Orthodox East has held universally only to the creeds and canons of the first seven ecumenical councils. Eastern Orthodoxy emphasized the consensus of the Christophorous laity, bearers of the tradition, while Roman Catholicism with Second Vati-
can recognized twenty-one such authoritative councils. All the churches emerging from the classical Protestant Reformation, Lutheran, Anglican, and Reformed, recognized at least the first four councils and, in addition, fashioned various binding articles and confessions supplementary to the ancient creeds. How markedly different was the spirit of the final revisers of the most authoritative of the corporate formulations of faith by the Socinians. Note their foreword to the last substantive revision of the Racovian Catechism of 1665:

The liberty... for which we plead is that which lies in the middle way between licentiousness and usurpation... [W]e now give it [the revised Catechism] to the public as a corrected rather than as a new work. For that which was published in...1609... is in some respects the same but now in many places enlarged, corrected and altered by the chief luminaries of our Church... For we do not think that we ought to be ashamed, if in some respects our Church improves... If you [the hostile reader or prospective convert] conceive that in any thing we are carried out of the path of truth, give us your friendly admonition.(20)

Freedom in religion did not inhibit the Socinians, at least from endeavoring to set down the consensus of faith and practice of their Church; and they allowed for change in formulation as a result of internal and external criticism. Criticism, they hoped, would be characterized by piety, charity, and prudence on the part of possible critics and for their part, in pondering that criticism, they hoped to follow the same virtues.

But freedom in the pentarchy of governing principles of liberal Christianity should have a corporate dimension, although this was not stressed by Wilbur. The early Christians, as a voluntary society among several such fellowships within Judaism, finally became aware of themselves as a New or True Israel, as royal priestly people, as self-conscious imperium in imperio. They organized their church in polemical parallelism with the Empire before Constantine. They were, moreover, in their far-flung conventicles, recruited at first from the fringes of the Greco-Roman demographic mix, much like the very types originally recruited as disciples by Jesus within Judaism. Slaves, freedmen, women — the latter of usually a grater range of class origin than the men(21) — the early Christians sometimes, in their sense of freedom from the pagan state and ambient society, often sought martyrdom in their conviction that as reborn through dying and rising with Christ in baptism, they now constituted an outpost of the militia Christi, awaiting the Advent of the heavenly Emperor. Their citizenship was, therefore, already in heaven. Proleptically they were already subjects of that Kingdom. From the beginning, the perfect freedom of Christians was not grounded in their being citizens in the societies of this world. But by the grace of baptism, they were subjects of Kingdom of their Lord at whose still humble table they sacramentally supped in memory and in hope of apocalyptic vindication.
They elected their bishops. The threefold ejaculation of axios, axios, axios in the enthronement of the modern Orthodox bishop is a fervid but no longer functional echo of what was once the decisively elective affirmation of the members of the church, setting aside one of their number chosen as their pastor: “He is worthy, worthy, worthy!” Even amid the pageantry of what has now become the installation of the Pope rather than his enthronization, elected now as sovereign of Vatican City by the College of Cardinals rather than by the people, there is the applause of the people of his diocese of Rome, an unrecognized democratized echo of the once formal liturgical laudes that constituted in antiquity and in the Middle Ages the part the lay faithful still retained in the election of the Bishop of Rome.

It may be hard for liberals to see in that still authoritarian institution an instance of Christian freedom in corporate form, but that temporal reality, as well as symbol of sovereignty, is the culmination of the struggle of Christianity in various organized forms to insist that the community of the reborn is not be subordinated to the state or to be automatically drawn into its service. In the time of the investiture controversy, only by withdrawing elective power from the faithful in Rome, in effect from the factions of the black nobility and finally even from the reform-minded, well intentioned German Emperors, and by reposing it in an increasingly international College of Cardinals and also by imposing celibacy on the sacerdotium in order to avoid a centrifugal and hereditary, national episcopate and priesthood, could the medieval Latin Church have recovered its universal mission and disentangled itself in some measure from the states of Christendom.

The struggle in more familiar forms was fought out by the medieval sectarians, by those of the radical reformation of the sixteenth century, and notably by the sectaries of the British seventeenth century, who (better than their analogues in the sixteenth century) usually retained a concern for the state even as they separated from it.

The civil liberties of that part of the world in which these liberties still survive trace their pedigrees to the religious liberties won on a territorial basis on the very limited principle of cuius regio, eius religio of the sixteenth century and in the jus reformandi privaum and domesticum. Together these at least allowed a religiously conscientious person of family or business corporation the right to an orderly departure from a religiously incompatible territory and even to non-conformist private worship within the territory, by leave of the local lord. In the process of gaining even greater liberty of conscience the struggle for religious freedom was especially significant in the British Isles. All sides there had their bigots and persecutors; but deeds and misdeeds together finally eventuated in the Glorious Revolution, 1688, and in the legal coexistence of the separate and different established church.
in Scotland and in England, in voluntarist chapels of non-conformists, and in the great political idea of a “loyal opposition.”

B. REASON

In religious discussion the familiar contrast is between reason and faith. There is a long history of this couplet. For Greek thinkers of almost all schools known to the first Christian Apologists, a division was made between the encyclical studies and philosophy. For the Greek philosophers into the Christian era, studies egkyklia were regarded collectively as the handmaiden (Latin: ancilla) of philosophy proper, their queen. When Christianity entered the realm of philosophic discourse, its Apologists and later theologians made philosophy with its antecedent studies encyclical, collectively, into the handmaiden of revelation, as was Hagar to Sarah (Galatians 4:22-31). Paul originally intended only that the revelation on Sinai, the Law, was ancillary to the revelation on Calvary, the Gospel. But as the hermeneutical use of this passage evolved, it was possible for most Church Fathers to find a place in the divine economy for philosophy as a servant of revelation in both dispensations, as Christians during the Gnostic crisis wrested the whole of the Old Testament from the Jews in defending the Demiurge of Genesis as one with the Father of Jesus Christ. There was, nevertheless, considerable difference among the Old Catholic Fathers as to whether faith — and by that they meant the propositions of faith — might be, should be, or should not be demonstrated so far as possible by reason.

Gnosis, it should be borne in mind, was not thought of as in any way connected with reason; it was in fact an esoteric modality of intuitional revelation. Thus in the conflict of the Ante-Nicene period between faith and reason, the Gnostics were wholly on the side of the exclusive claims of revelation with their extravagant webs of cosmogonic and soteriological speculation. The Church catholic became in general the defender of the proper use of reason relative to revelation, though even some Gnostics themselves magnanimously argued that the simple psychics could be saved by faith alone without comprehension of the convoluted Gnostic system. The Church catholic in the Ante-Nicene period developed three positions: that there should be no relation between faith and reason, revelation and philosophy, Jerusalem and Athens, in line with Col. 2:18 “Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy.”(26) Tertullian, although a proponent of this view, surely used his sharp reasoning powers not only to defend Christianity against pagans and Jews but also eventually to defend his own sectarian rigorist views against Christians he regarded as heretics and finally against the Church catholic itself. But throughout his important career, in which he virtually coined the major technical terms for subsequent Latin theology, Tertullian still did not hold that reason had a creative role in theology except in rhetorically pressing for the acceptance of revealed doctrines or moral precepts. He said instead: “[T]he [revealed] fact is certain because it is impossible” and “I believe because it is absurd.”
Clement of Alexandria, in contrast, held that reason and hence philosophy had God-assigned roles in making revelation clear as systematic theology, though he did not use the latter word. His was a double-faith theory, combining the Aristotelian “faith” and the Stoic “assent of the reasoning faculty.” In other words, one is not saved by reason but reason must be saved. Origen, his successor in Alexandria, held that there were two ways: salvation by simple faith or by knowledge with faith. He regarded rationally demonstrated faith as superior.

At the height of scholasticism, Aristotle was called simply the Philosopher and Averroes was called simply the Commentator. Aristotle was to the Christian schoolmen like a great peak in the Greek philosophical chain, rising nearly to the height of Sinai and Calvary. In fact, Aquinas wrote his Contra Gentes up to the last part, basing his arguments solely on reason in the sense of encyclical observation and philosophical insight, as he argued with Averroes and with Jewish commentators on the common religious tenets that could be held by all men on the basis of Aristotle and the natural reason alone, without the benefit of revelation.

It was classical Protestantism that took up the Tertullianic position. Luther regarded reason as much fallen as the heart, as the will, and as the flesh. Although he started out applauding a popular mystical tract, which was his first publication (1516) and which he called Theologie Deutsch, he very soon withdrew from the common Catholic position that there is some organ of sensibility to faith, like the apex mentis or the scintilla animae or the synteresis. Luther then came to hold that saving faith is a pure gift of God for which there can be no preparatory action in man either through mystical discipline and ecstasy or though demonstrative reason or good works. Classical Protestantism was thus, in principle, based upon faith alone, the hearing of scripture alone, and the response thereto in the mystery of predestined election and vocation by grace alone. (Only in disguised forms did a kind of rational or voluntarist mysticism later return under the modalities of Pietism or Puritanism or Cambridge Platonism and much later Methodism.) In Luther’s lifetime the rational and the mystical were programmatically rejected in mainline Protestantism. Reason seemed to have defeated faith in the Christian Averroist double-faith theory; and later, in eclectic nominalist scholasticism, faith seemed to have been transformed into a synergistic, if not neo-Pelagian, view of human capability to use free will for works that would merit divine acceptance. But Luther renounced reason, mysticism, and good works of the free will as elements in and examples of human pride. Reason would, to be sure, be able to recover an honorable place alongside revelation and tradition in Anglicanism, only in the work of the Elizabethan Richard Hooker, and much later in Calvinist and Lutheran Neo-scholasticism or orthodoxy.

The radical reformation in the sixteenth century, except for a few individual Evangelical Rationalists, was much like classical Protestantism with respect to reason, holding it back from the precincts of
revelation, whether of the Bible as a whole or, as was far more common among them, from the revelation of the New Testament as superior to the Old. In this, as already indicated, Socinus was really quite different from the few humanist rationalists of the century, like Sebastian Franck, Sebastian Castellio, John de Valdés, Bernardine Ochino, and Celio Curione who did have a place for universal reason and some also for mysticism in the precincts of faith. But Socinus held strictly to the revelation of Jesus Christ and his apostles and he even allowed natural reason to be contorted in arguing for some almost esoterically preferred interpretations of New Testament revelation, which he was at the same time bold enough to say that he was the first to perceive correctly.

The followers of Socinus or the Polish Brethren stressed the New Testament. The Unitarians in Transylvania, like the Reformed, considered the Bible as a whole a rectilinear revelation. (Francis Dávid himself came to prefer the Old over the New.) But Socinians and Transylvanians created the conditions that were to give rise in their midst, after the death of David in 1579 and of Socinus in 1604, to a gradual rehabilitation of reason in the realm of revelation; so that Socinianism, in any case, has been commonly considered, perhaps too uncritically, to have been a forerunner of Deism.(28)

At the same time, common to several individuals and groups within the radical reformation in the sixteenth century, there was the preservation of popularized mysticism and the conviction the enlightened conscience was the responsive organ of faith which could prepare for its reception. Such was the case among Anabaptists as different as John Denck and Peter Walpot of the Hutterites, among Spiritualists as different as Caspar Schwenckfeld and Thomas Muntzer, and among Evangelical Rationalists like Franck and Castellio, the latter translating the Theologie Deutsch into Latin.(29) Mysticism was, to be sure, not prominent even in the main line of Unitarianism any more than with classical Protestantism, just as mysticism in any specialized sense was also absent in the New Testament Epoch.

But before we leave the couplet of reason and faith, philosophy and revelation, we cannot but acknowledge that Socinianism in its English modality was often linked with rational Christianity or even Deism; and the ultimate transformation of the couplet turned out to be science and religion and the place of religion in primary, secondary, and university education.(30) Indeed this had already taken place, before the Socinian influx, in the Novum Organum and the House of Salomon in the New Atlantis of Francis Bacon.

Thus there were other liberal Christians, besides Unitarians and Universalists, who could see in the Copernican revolution, in the Baconian approbation of the “Moderns,” in Newtonian physics, in German higher criticism of Scripture, in Darwinian evolution, and in Marxist sociological historiography the regnant principle to which the reasonable Christian would accommodate whatever seemed
to remain valid in a distinctive revelation (if there be any revelation at all, other than the various religious institutionalizations and formulations of diverse perceptions of the mystery of the cosmos and of rational beings emerging from our globlet of cosmic stuff). Already with the distinction between the noumenological (inaccessible to us) and in the phenomenal world which man takes in by virtue of certain innate aprioris, Immanuel Kant, himself of Pietist antecedents, had left over only the categorical imperative and a presumption of immortality. George Fredrich Schleiermacher, the veritable founder of Protestant nineteenth-century theology, had no more than “the feeling of dependence” as the residue of what was once explicit, revealed faith over against the ever growing domain of reason even in the realm of religion itself.

In the course of the nineteenth century, little by little in liberal circles the couple, faith and reason, had been so redefined that reason became tantamount to the sciences, the natural and humane, depending on where the more spectacular hypotheses were being advanced. Faith was thus voided, in effect, of content as belief or creedal confession and came to mean instead confidence, sometimes confidence in the unfolding scientific panorama, sometimes specifically confidence in man because of, or despite, what was coming to be discovered about his evolutionary antiquity and hence his presumably inseparable, because innate, proneness to violence. Thus we had for the first time faith, in effect confidence, subordinated or ancillary to science (reason’s progeny) or even in the Hegelian Idealism of the right, to raison d’état, or in the inverted Hegelian dialectical materialism of the left, to service of a (redemptive) class — the proletariat of the world.

While the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and of Max Scheler and eventually the hermeneutical phenomenology of the invisible of Martin Heidegger have provided a rational methodology for the removal of all presuppositions and preconceptions, allowing for the reality and perceptibility of that which Kant regarded as beyond rational capability, all these variants of phenomenology must in principle exclude a separate input called revelation. That is why the process theology deriving from Alfred North Whitehead had found followers especially in the liberal religious tradition because therein the patristic problematic of faith and reason is no longer posed while what is valid in both becomes intermingled in the personal and corporate and cosmic process.

In our very own time, perhaps, we can date, at least in popular and global terms, from the American landing on the moon and from our first photographic glimpse of our blue-white planet, at once our terrestrial and our celestial abode, the general realization that the older couplet of faith and reason has lost validity. In the ongoing work of submolecular physics and astrophysics and molecular biology, in the discovery of the genetic code with its societal implications, in the subtle laws perceived in sociobiology, amid the experiences in our own life or by observation in our own circles — we note still another permutation of the faith-reason couplet in the current shift. It is in the randomness
of submolecular activity and the want of uniformity in the behavior of the vast and seemingly vio-
lenit universe of unconnected, variously driven cosmic vortices and other stellar populations. And we
now face the shuddering hypothesis that we may now detect in faint cosmic radiations of heat waves
barely above absolute zero the still throbbing debris of a former cosmos. We stand again in terror,
almost like primitive man at an eclipse, before the mysterium tremendum et fascinosum of the awe-
some and seemingly rulerless blackness of our sky at night.

The counterpart of the high priest of propitiation to the unknown deities is for many persons in the
academic circle now the great astrophysicist or molecular biologist. We, their lesser devotees in cos-
mic consciousness, feel the cold winds from off outer space; and in chilling loneliness many of us or
those we know have clambered over each other in trying to find the exact Oriental cult or venerable
discipline that might be appropriate to such cosmic unpredictability and the frightening vagaries of
submolecular randomness. Reason is no longer ancillary to faith but faith has, especially among the
young become frantic confidence in whatever, charismatic or cultic, can deliver one from the terror
of the wilderness exposed by reason-science both within the human heart and above the turmoiled
abyss. In Genesis the Spirit hovered over the deep in tranquillity, preparing it to bring forth life. How
now do we yearn for that breath of God blown into man himself, shaped from the dust of a Paradise
which we now know never was!

That modern colored photograph of our planet as seen from the moon prompts us to perceive the
ecological oneness of humanity and its living and elementary environments(31) and, probably
deeper, the ultimate unity of the religious and moral aspirations of those peoples who are so vis-
ibly and conceptually one, as we look at our blue and white globe in the blackness of interplanetary
space. We surely cannot, however, have the optimistic view of Jenkin Lloyd Jones, portrayed in the
one of our papers, looking down from the grand Ferris Wheel at the World Columbian Exposition in
Chicago in 1893, exclaiming: “If the altitude of two hundred and seventy feet makes homogeneous
the heterogeneous crowd of the Midway Plaisance, may not a little altitude lift from the soul the
clothes of creed, sect, and denomination?”(32)

Just eighty-six years later we have vague presentiments that there could in the future, for many
urgent reasons, emerge not a cooperative congeries of global communities, political, religious, and
academic, but rather a totalitarian organization of society, a kingdom not of God but of the ideologi-
cally, technologically, and demographically superior society. It is this ultimate threat that makes both
reasonableness and watchful tolerance, our next mark of liberal religion, more important now than
ever in the past.
C. TOLERANCE AND MUTUALLY CORRECTIVE PLURALISM

The very nature and function of religion are such that they drive a given society engendered by it or adopted by it toward outward and, if possible, toward inward conformity, though there is also something about the human condition that leads to dissent and schism even in the worst of totalitarian organizations. Generally, however, in the most ancient societies, there was differentiation of functionaries, as in any colony of social insects. The god-king, the divinely sanctioned ruler, was in control of the religious apparatus and its chief celebrant.

Israel, virtually alone among the nations, contributed, in the unusual course of its covenantal history under its Lord of Hosts, a jealous God, to the institutionalization of the idea of the three God-sanctioned functionaries: the anointed king, the anointed priests of several classes, and the inspired prophets, only one of whom, however, Elisha, was anointed (I Kings 19:16). Nathan could say to David: “Thou art the man,” and not suffer the consequences of his prophetic forthtelling. Christianity fell heir to this tradition, when it began to find in the prophets not merely retellers of the story of the covenants and promises, nor only foretellers of peaceful days and even of an anointed king of plenary righteousness, but also forthtellers to the people of their own generation. Thus Bishop Ambrose of Milan consciously wrapped himself in the mantle of Elijah when he defended Naboth’s vineyard (the true Church) against the heretical empress and called her to here face Jezebel. When he rebuked the orthodox Emperor Theodosius, Ambrose compelled him to repent for the enormity of his crime in Thessalonica, At the same time, Ambrose could not arise above the concept of uniformity of religion and conformity, for he rebuked the same emperor for compensating a congregation of Jews for the willful destruction of their synagogue by Christians, and he rebuked the Western imperial authorities for giving a single place of worship to the Arian Germans serving in the imperial army encamped near Milan.(34)

Religious toleration without inherent religious relativism is the precious fruit of an almost exotic vine growing, historically, as it were furtively, on the exterior of the main edifice of Christianity. It is a vine with few leaves among its scrawny, poorly watered branches and aerial rootlets, clustering here and there in transitions in Christian history, as it were at cornices or on narrow ledges. There, more because of the temporary loss of faith on the part of the leadership in church and state, the sun of benign neglect allowed for a season a temporary burgeoning of foliage, and only in modern times allowed for fruitage, earliest in the Rhaetian Republic (now largely a part of southeast Switzerland), in the Principality of Transylvania, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for a precarious but at least almost martyr-free century from 1556 to 1660,(35) in the United Netherlands, and then in Britain in the seventeenth century especially after 1689.
Just as it has been possible for divergent expressions of Christianity to come to light and even fruit-agein periods when the leadership of the established church or the ideology of the state have inwardly lost faith, as least in the particularities of the established belief, so in all cases — save one — religious minorities have sought toleration in the inward conviction that theirs was the only true form of church and doctrine sufficient for salvation. Thus, while usually professing loyalty to the state that might grant such toleration, the various claimants of religious toleration were, until recent times, largely convinced that they in the end would alone be eternally saved. Even Catholics, long accustomed to preeminent and sole religious authority, in lands of the Reformation where they were suddenly a minority and much later in the United States (which on principle separated church ad state) upheld religious toleration up to as recently as the Second Vatican Council only as an “hypothesis.” that is, as a provisional arrangement, without abandoning the traditional “thesis” that salvation was possible only through that Church or, out of invincible ignorance, through certain other Christian ecclesial bodies.(36) This is not to say that there have been no great individual Catholic or Lutheran or Reformed or Anglican proponents of toleration until modern times, while being themselves also personally intensely Christian in whatever modality. But officially what I have said in generalization holds.

The exception regarding exclusive salvation to which I referred above is the Church of the Polish Brethren. They tended to be pacifist, although their leaders, both patrons and many ministers, belonged to the noble class, for which the sward in its sheath was as much a part of public dress as one’s boots. Yet these Unitarians sought toleration, neither as religious relativists nor as exclusivistic bigots. They truly believed that no only those inside their Church but also those outside their Church who followed the precepts of Christ, whether these non-Socinians had become acquainted with essential moral guidance of Christ through a Lutheran sermon or at a Catholic mass, would be saved for eternal life. The Socinians were a minority, but their theory of toleration rested on the view that religion is all-important and that its most profound effects upon personal behavior and upon the cohesion and order to society, an acknowledged legitimate concern of the state, stem from the freedom with which, in humility, all religious groups recognize that they might not have the plenitude of Christ’s saving truth. The Socinians believed in full tolerance in a non-coercive society where “dissidents concerning religion” could engage in personal or group exchange or debate about Truth and where no particular group, whether already dominant or becoming dominant, would prevail at the expense of the others through preferential treatment by the political machinery of the Commonwealth. Many of these Unitarian Polish Brethren believed, like Origen and the ancient unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus, that true Christians could, though a minority, save by their prayer and godly example the whole of the Roman world or, in the Socinian case, the whole of the vast Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
The Danzig disciple of Socinus, Christopher Ostorodt, developed this in his Brief Instruction, on the model of God’s answer to the appeal of Abraham to spare Sodom and Gomorrah from destruction: “Yea, I will not destroy them, if there be ten [righteous men therein].” In the case of Ostorodt and his fellow-Socinians the belief was specifically that Jesus as King of the universe and of the nations had been given the power of the God of Abraham to intervene to save Poland from external attack from Muscovy or from the Turks if there could be therein a comparable percentage of Truthservers.

My own conviction about religious toleration, both ecumenical and interfaith, is that mankind has over its some three millions of years of evolution responded to, and developed, institutional and conceptual formulations about the Ultimate, transcendent, and immanent: externally in an ever-enlarging conception of the “world,” and internally, in an even profounder penetration of the abyss of divine reality within persons as a group and in a different way as individuals. These innumerable liturgical actions and theological formulations should never claim to have exhausted the meaning of that infinite power that moves the distant galaxies apart. Thus I believe in non-reductionist interfaith ecumenism, without however, delegitimizing the right to proselytize. Moreover, I believe that within the Judaeo-Christian development, and notably in the Christ-event, something happened of religious and ethical significance for all mankind giving both human history and our individual destiny enhanced significance. The world in its secular calendar does date the new of our years in all four overhalving hemispheres from the birth of a man foreseen by generations of prophets, a man who suffered on the cross and yet returned in some form to those closest to him and who promised that his Kingdom would someday be corporately manifest in glory. Although the world religion named after him has at the least two inherently conflicting eschatologies, and although the Church has ever and again been divided by heresy and schism, sectarianism, and ascetic withdrawals, I think that the time has arrived when Christians, who were onceembarrassed by the multiplicity of churches and sects, can rejoice in the plentitude of Christ who has called forth in so many climes and times such diverse variations on his own partly enigmatic themes as refracted through the apostles he ordained and the Fathers, the schoolmen, the sectarians, the reformers, and the liberal dissenters who followed in their turn.

To think of a completed ecumenicity in universal organizational or hierarchical terms (the pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic Church) is to adopt as normative merely one of the most impressive, but not the oldest, of the modalities of Christian togetherness (koinonia, sobornost, fellowship communion), which even in itself shows a vast range of personal and regional spirituality.

Neither the religiously tolerant politiques of almost every European land in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, who were, as they thought, above the niceties of theological thought and discipline in their primary concern for the welfare of their state or nation, nor the religiously tolerant among
the faithful majorities in various lands of Old Christendom and its counterpart in the Catholic and Protestant New World could until well into the seventeenth century institutionalize socially and then politically the idea of a collective prophetic role, the idea of a religious and then a political loyal opposition. It was, of course, as we know, only the dismemberment of the British corpus Christianum in the seventeenth century with the beheading of the Supreme Governor of the Church of England, with the two Civil Wars, a Restoration of kingship, and a Glorious Revolution that religious toleration finally seemed to be theologically possible as well as politically expedient. On the political side, there emerged the concept and institutionalization also of His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.

This is a political principle impossible for Communists to conceive, not to say practice (just as it was for approximately seventeen centuries of Christian history). For Communists, at least in the first generation of devotees, the Marxist ideology serves much like a religious confession of faith that cannot tolerate another party, not to speak of another ideology, except on the basis of expediency. They seek to control, for example, the Church of the still loyal masses by paying all or part of the salary of the priests or ministers but they prevent all education of the youth and all philanthropy or charity or proselytism.(41) This is perhaps especially true of Russian Communism — Mao Tse-Tung at least once spoke of many flowers. The socialist-bloc countries do not expunge Christianity outright for the prudential reason given. But Moscow, the Third Rome and the capital of the disbanded Third Socialist International, is heir to the Byzantine tradition, in which the Patriarch in Constantinople was subordinated to the Emperor in a way in which his counterpart in Rome never was to the Eastern Emperor and after 800 A.D. to the Western. And it is still impossible for the surviving and long persecuted Patriarchal Church of Moscow to understand internal constructive criticism — even that constitutionally guaranteed. Their representative prelates abroad really need not be instructed in the Party line or accompanied by “advisers,” for they have so long understood religion as subject to the state, especially since the suppression of the Patriarchate by Peter the Great. Most Orthodox spokesmen in the World Council of Christian Churches or at the Vatican can inwardly adjust to the fact that their state is, to be sure, like that of the pre-Constantinian Roman Empire. But then nevertheless they fervidly proclaim with the Communists the Party plan for world peace, the rights of underdeveloped nations against “capitalist imperialists,” and the degeneracy of Western “liberalism,” especially as expressed by its unconventional youth.(42)

One of the saints of the Russian Orthodox Church was a revered, charismatic hermit of the forest, to whom Ivan IV, the Terrible, sent annually his messenger with a Lenten greeting and with the expectation of receiving the yearly oracle of the hermit to the Tsar. The hermit, well aware of the unwonted savagery of Ivan’s government, somehow got a hold of a rabbit, and placing the skinned and bloody shank of the poor animal (which in the Slavic languages bears a name that means “king”) in the messenger’s hand, said to him: “Tell our king, it were far better that he eat meat in Lent than
devour his people.” Ivan had the impudent hermit-prophet slain. But such acts of individual or corporate opposition are very uncommon in Byzantine-Slavic Orthodox history. And even the modern counterpart of the forest hermit, the exiled Soviet critic in his Vermont forest, in his electronically guarded compound, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, is very much like a Russian nationalist, who among other things cannot understand, for example, the “license and irresponsibility,” as he calls it of the American press.

But having jumped from symbolic rock to rock across the stream of history to our contemporary shore, we find the place to say something strong about corporate toleration. Dr. Wilbur’s mark of liberal Christianity, the concern for tolerance, must be seen by us today in aspects of social concern that are not readily identified as religious, like cultural and ethnic pluralism and what are not yet fully implemented legitimate civil liberties. Still, we recognize very clearly that the further we go and the more uncritically we espouse everything that purports to be a civil liberty and personal right, to that extent we also relativize social norms. We also weaken the cohesion of the Republic and, indeed, incur the risk of becoming crushed as and ever shrinking North Atlantic cultural community where these principles are indeed taken for granted, only to be eventually strangled by the immense energies and cunning corporeality of what is historically normative for mankind, the totalitarian organization of society, however narrowly or broadly that is conceived (whether that be as once a valley clan or as now an ideological superpower). With Communism’s ideology at least as universal in intent as Christian theology, whether Roman Catholic or Universalist; with its programmatic concern for the poor, for the oppressed, and for the alienated; and with its political and technological capability now become potentially global and even alluring for several large stretches of the developing nations of the Third World; we are in need of careful definitions of toleration, personal and collective, ideological as well as confessional.

We turn, not wholly abruptly, to the fourth of Dr. Wilbur’s remarks.

**D. BEHAVIOR**

Dr. Wilbur felt, as noted above, that if Christians had not been so much preoccupied with definitions of doctrine, in Antiquity with Triadology and Christology, in the Middle Ages with papal authority and the sacraments, in the Reformation with justification by faith alone, Christians would have more often, in nearly two thousand years, attended to the improvement of personal conduct or behavior and made themselves worthy in the light of Christ to achieve reasonable harmony in the present life as well as eternity in the next. But, by way of comparison, Judaism and Islam have been religions of laws, precepts and both liturgical and moral customs, but somewhat less of conceptualized doctrines. Their theorists have tended to be closer to interpreters of revealed jurisprudence than Christians,
who, even if they developed a canon law, distinguished that body of principles from those of theology and ethics. Yet even Jews and Muslims have also had their full share of schisms and sectaries, just like the Christians: the Hebrews from the first schism, as it were, between Judah and Samaria up to the considerable range of present-day traditions, some of them even mystical and charismatic, in both Sephardic and Ashkenazic Judaism. And Islam had its great schism of Shiites and Sunnites, as Christendom early displayed the first fissure of what would be finalized in 1054 as the schism between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Every religion seems to be a mixture of cement and dynamite, mortaring societies together, but also, on occasion, blowing them apart.

For all that, common to the three great world religions stemming from the loins of Abraham and his decisive act of faith on Mount Moriah is the fundamental acceptance of the genetic unity of mankind, deriving from Adam and Eve. Strangely, Judaism and Islam drew from the common account of the fall only the innate double tendency in persons to do good and evil. But Christianity, through the theological insight of Paul, held Jesus to be the Second or last Adam, recapitulating in the wilderness after baptismal repentance what Adam might have done if obedient to God in paradise. The New Testament writers and the Old Catholic Fathers found that all mankind or in some cases together with nature (the whole of creation groaneth in travail, Rom. 8:22) had fallen in Adam. To be sure, some of the Fathers, the Cappadocians among them, and in the Western Middle Ages notably Rupert of Deutz, developed the idea of the Happy Fault of Adam (felix culpa). Adam’s trespass made it possible for God to improve on his creation by sending Christ in the fullness of time, the Second Adam, in whom the whole of mankind could once again be taken up because in the God-Man the human, in a Platonic sense the essence of humanity, had been divinized. Thus the Eastern Church, as much the heir of Paul as the Latin Church, made somewhat less of original sin than the West, and even pictured Christ in his harrowing of hell as rescuing Adam and Eve first among the ancient worthies. The Latin West, again largely because of Augustine, stressed the pervasiveness of original sin, a legacy which was further intensified by the classical Protestant Reformers beginning with Luther, and which became most profound and theologically formative in the Calvinist tradition.

It is of interest that Michael Servetus believed in the felix culpa but, more important, that the radical reformers in general disavowed original sin in different ways. The Anabaptists held that Christ by his obedience on Calvary took away the original sin of all mankind and left the ordinance of believers’ baptism whereby one could betoken one’s having been inwardly cleansed of personal sin and one’s having accepted the covenant of good works unto salvation. Aztec and Augsburg babies were put thereby at the same starting point for the race of life. The Transylvanian Unitarians, to be sure, retained infant baptism lest their privileged juridical status be jeopardized by a conspicuous innovation, but also renounced the doctrine of original sin. So likewise did the Polish Brethren, at least by c. 1580. However, before and after Socinus they practiced believers’ immersion and avowed,
even more than the Anabaptists, that it had its inherent efficacy by grace, when it was preceded by catechetical instruction and followed by the solemn first communion. But it is of behavior that we are speaking. Only the morally upright parents among the Transylvanians might have their infants admitted to baptism. All members were subject to quite public excommunication for misbehavior, and only the morally upright catechumens in Poland might be immersed. Still, it is not of sacraments that I wish here to speak but of the principles of conduct, of personal and public behavior.

So we return to the Christians of the ancient Church and to some other inferences drawn from the place of Adam and Christ in their thought. Christians took the paradisiac pair as paradigmatic for marriage and would later, as sacramental theology developed, speak of monogamous matrimony as the one sacrament ordained by God in Paradise before the Fall and reconsecrated by Christ at the marriage of Cana, where he performed his first miracle. Matrimony, for Paul, became a metaphor for the relationship of Christ and his Church, and, for the Seer of Revelation, the imagery of the eschatological relationship of the Church as Bride prepared for the Bridegroom. The early bishops were never to be elected from widowers who had entered upon a second marriage. How marked the contrast with Judaism, not to say Islam. Jewry within Christendom continued plural marriages of the patriarchal type until about the year 1000 C.E. In the State of Israel only recently was plural marriage among Oriental Jews disallowed, and it still continues for Jews as an option in Muslim lands.

The Adam myth operated among Christians and Jews differently with respect to offspring. The Jews, like the Stoics, held that a child became a person only on taking its first breath, on the analogy of Adam’s inhaling the breath of God after being molded from clay, and a son of the covenant only by circumcision on the eighth day. Jewish practices, accordingly, with respect to the mother in childbirth and to the disposal of the incomplete fetus and even the born, yet unconsecrated child are different from those for the child ritually taken into the covenant. For Christians the child began as a person, shaped by God in its mother’s womb. The Gospel narrative of the fetal John the Baptist and Jesus leaping in their mothers’ wombs (Luke 1:41-44) kept before Christians the idea of the sacredness of human life from conception, the more so as the Church came to emphasize the conception by the Holy Spirit and the Virgin birth of the Word incarnate, and as Mary Theotokos herself came to be considered as exceptional among women in having been immaculately conceived by her parents.

Tertullian contributed importantly to the early Christian sanctification of monogamy and of life from conception. He developed also one of the four major Christian theories on the origin of the soul, traducianism, according to which the soul and body, as by cloning, came together from the loins of fallen Adam and fallen Eve. So if the doctrine of original sin laid burdens upon even conjugal sexuality, it indirectly extended its protection over unborn human life. Christians were different from those about them in the Graeco-Roman world in that they did not commit abortion or infanticide but
even sought out pagan infants exposed, as the euphemism went, and also orphans. In fact, the well informed critic of Christianity, Celsus, pointed to this practice as one of the important factors in the spread of the pestiferous new sect.

Without rehearsing a long history, suffice it to say that Luther, the friar who married a former nun, had read Augustine very carefully on the origin of the soul. But misconstruing his great theological mentor of Hippo, Luther decided that Augustine was a traducianist, which was not so. Thus Luther reinforced in the sixteenth century an early Christian conviction about abortion that the Thomist adoption of Aristotle’s ideas had weakened.(44)

Again, it was the radical reformation in all three branches that seized upon marriage as God-ordained, while classical Protestantism had desacralized marriage; and one of the great national churches of the era literally came into being over the problem of dynastic continuity and the legitimacy of divorce. Marriage in the left wing of the reformation became covenantal with the woman, as in the ancient Church, more nearly her husband’s equal. Among the Polish Brethren and Sisters the distinctive marriage service included a double ring ceremony. Marriage among all groupings in the radical reformation was construed above all a type and embodiment of the covenantal view of companionship as with Adam and Eve in Paradise. There were, to be sure, aberrations, as the radicals sought new forms of making marriage conform to Scripture. Some insisted on divorce if the wife or husband would not accept the new faith; but in large measure the conception of marriage as belonging to the orders of redemption, and not merely of creation, represented an enormous advance over even the Catholic sacramental conception of marriage. This understanding of marriage should be regarded as one of the valuable legacies of sectarian Christianity from the sixteenth century, coming to flower in the nineteenth century, and now retreating under modern influences of many kinds.

After the close of the New Testament Epoch the eyes of Christians centered on four scriptural landscapes, as it were, paradise before the Fall, the wilderness of Sinai where Moses received the Law, the mount where the disciples heard the Sermon of the Beatitudes, and — not quite a landscape — the Jewish community of saints in Jerusalem who held their goods in common.(45) The Christian community of rebirth through baptism from the beginning of Christianity set the Church apart from all natural communities of race, class and nation. As they said with respect to the first category, they were a Third Race, neither Jew nor Gentile, but like the Jews separated from the world. The discipline of the early Church into the fourth century and continued by monastic communities to the present day has been characteristic of Christianity in general (and, surprising as it may seem, the mark of almost all those communities out of which stem the programmatically liberal Christian bodies of the present day).
Monks, canons regular, and friars considered themselves continuators of the commune of saints in Jerusalem, sharing all things.

The radical Hussites, having recovered the chalice for the laity, met for eucharistic celebrations on the hilltops of Bohemia. Some of them were necessarily armed; and their camps became towns, of which the most notable was Tabor. The Anabaptists were all communitarian to a degree; and the Hutterites in Moravia were veritable pacifist commonwealths, with nearly complete internal sovereignty, protected by lords who valued their agriculture, industry, and frugality. Caspar Schwenckfeld, himself a former Teutonic knight, remained celibate and tried to reform the monasteries and convents of Silesia in a Protestant sense. Failing in this he gathered communities in homes of different well-to-do patronesses; and, suspending the Lord’s Supper (as everywhere, alas, the occasion of discord in the Reformation Era rather than fraternal communion), he encouraged his followers to seek the once-for-all experience of tasting the heavenly manna, the celestial flesh of Christ, like the children of Israel wondering in the wilderness.

The Polish Brethren at Rakow established their own commune on the model of a Hutterite Bruderhof. After more than one pilgrimage to the Moravian center of restored Christian communism, the Hutterite bishop rejected fellowship with the Polish Brethren on the grounds of their excessive education and their disavowal of the doctrine of the Trinity, though the two groups were alike pacifists and believers’ baptists.

The communitarian thrust continued in other groups that are not considered seedbeds of a later liberal Christianity, in the Family of Love, the Quakers, and the reorganized Bohemians, by now wholly Germanized as the Moravian Brethren in the refuge established for them at Herrnhut (1722) by their protector and chief spokesman, Count Nicholas von Zinzendorf, and in the class meetings of the Wesleyans. And this communal thrust had its counterpart in a strong discipline. There were communitarian thrusts in Joseph Priestley’s cooperative plantation in Pennsylvania, in the Transcendentalist George Ripley’s Brook Farm, and in the Universalist Adin Ballou’s Hopedale.

Of the classical Protestant churches of the sixteenth century personal discipline, in relation particularly to admission to communion, was in general most latitudinarian in Anglicanism, most rigoristic in the Reformed churches. All the churches of the radical reformation were strong on personal and group discipline. They were consciously descendants of the rigorists of the pre-Constantinian period as distinguished from the laxists, as the disciplinarians called the incipient Catholics of their day. For the essence of the catholic church is in its being the saintly community for salvation, with saints and
sinners sustained by the grace of sacred sacraments, while the rigorists stressed personal holiness in the church or the sect as a communion of saints already saved.

The Polish Brethren/Socinians exercised as strong a discipline as the Mennonites, with whom they had several times sought to federate in the region of the upper Vistula and later in Holland. The Unitarian communion Sunday was preceded by a whole Saturday of mutual confession and gentle re-buke of fellowmembers and counter-explanations, ending with a consensus as to who might partake of communion the following day. The Polish Unitarians were, unlike most of the rank and file of the congeries of movements called the radical reformation, in the first instance drawn from the nobility; and it is remarkable that so many of them not only became pacifists but also in many cases released their serfs and joined with them as brothers and sisters at Christ’s Table.(46)

Transylvanian Unitarianism was a mixture of petty nobles, patricians, artisans, and free farmers. Their discipline was also firm with respect to communion. To this day one can still see the open, often vine-covered archades of the older and the rural Unitarian churches, where persons excommunicated, on moral grounds, stood in public penance, as the upright filed into the place of worship to take their seats, men on one side, women on the other. (Some extreme followers of David developed into a practice his own final view about the worship of God on Saturday-Sabbath and separated off as Sabbatarians from the remaining Unitarians and ended their existence as non-ethnic Jews.[47])

E. SALVATION

One cannot make a heading of this final section Clarke’s “Salvation by Character,” for that is too faint a nineteenth-century echo of the strong soteriological views of the sixteenth-century forerunners of modern liberal Christianity. To speak only of the first Universalists and Unitarians, calling themselves such, in America, there was among the former the formative conviction that Christ’s atoning act on Calvary had saved all mankind and that the good news consisted in making known what had already been accomplished, while the early Unitarians, coming as they did from the Arminians, retained vestiges of the doctrine of election. Later Adin Ballou published Atonement (1805), while William Ellery Channing removed the cosmic gallows as an engine of the loving God in his sermon, Unitarian Christianity Most Favorable to Piety (1826), although he retained the view that “Jesus Christ...the great emancipator...came to give liberty to human nature” (The Perfect Life).(48)

In all religions and particularly in Judaism and Christianity, there are in general four loci of salvific action: 1) an event in the past, like the crossing of the Red Sea or the crucifixion; 2) an experience in the ongoing present, like the taking of the covenant, the experience of vocation, of mystical ecstasy, communion, justification by faith, the second blessing of holiness, the speaking in tongues;
3) an experience in the future, either the coming of the Kingdom, the achievement of immortality, or the realization of the ideals of the Kingdom by human effort in league with a cosmic force for ultimate good; and 4) the already mentioned metaphistorical decrees of election and reprobation, kismet or karma (to which might be added today the deterministic decrees of the genetic code and sociobiology).(49)

The persons and groupings whose history is recorded by Dr. Wilbur have had a place for all four of these loci of decisive divine action and the human experience of benefaction. Yet it can be remarked that there were two major views of salvation among Christians of antiquity, one genetically Hebraic and the other osmotically Hellenic in origin, continuing into modern Catholic eschatology, which were never satisfactorily sutured even in the most recent papal requiem mass. The first was the Hebraic view that the Messiah would come (a second time) as King and Judge of the living and of the resurrected righteous dead (Isaiah 28:19) or of the righteous and unrighteous (Daniel 12:2). The second was the Hellenic idea that the souls immediately upon death go, at least provisionally, to their reward. The forerunners and developers of religious liberalism also retained both eschatologies but in modified forms.

All three groupings of the radical reformation tended to sense the Second Advent of Christ as imminent. This contrasted with the views of the classical Reformers, although Luther would have been closest to the radicals on imminency. Calvin and Cranmer were much more Catholic in assuming the relatively long preduration of Christendom. To single out extremes, Servetus calculated two possible dates for the Second Advent, one in 1570. Joseph Priestly, pre-millenarian honorary citizen of revolutionary France, wrote to Thomas Jefferson shortly before he became president that the approach of Napoleon Bonaparte to Egypt presaged the re-establishment of the State of Israel and thus the Second Advent of Christ. The great chemist believed that in the Kingdom of Christ higher animals, too, would receive their solace for what they had suffered in life at the hands of cruel men.(50)

In the sixteenth century millenarianism was revived for consideration and held to by many Polish Brethren and by some Transylvanian Unitarians, including the Sabbatarians. The universal restoration of all things, in some cases of animals no less than of persons who would have died beyond the ken of Christ, was held by many of the fringe personalities of the radical reformation. Restorationism was a major motif in early American Universalism, as also millenarianism in the emergence since 1920 of a growing social conscience among the neo-Evangelicals.(51)

As to the eschatology of the individual, the radical reformers of the sixteenth century were again closest to Luther. They and he, for the most part, followed the Hebraic line rather than the Hellenic,
and they found no basis in the Old Testament at all and scarcely any in the New for a provisional immortality immediately upon death. Luther, Anabaptists, Spiritualists of disparate kinds, and Evangelical Rationalists, for the most part, and expressly the Socinians believed in the death of the body with the soul, psychopannychism and the resurrection only, it seems of the righteous. The reason that this belief in what was also called euphemistically soul sleep did not become a part of confessional Lutheranism is that the chief confession of Lutheranism was that it presented at Augsburg in 1530 in the presence of the Emperor with as Catholic a phrasing as the Wittenberg reformers could devise. Thus Lutheranism and Calvinism — Calvin expressly wrote against psychopannychism — and Anglicanism continued the Catholic view of provisional immortality minus purgatory. Only in the seventeenth century was Anglicanism, partly under the influence of imported Socinianism, involved in what by preference and more accurately was then called the mortalist controversy.

If many of those whom we have come to canonize as forerunners of religious liberalism were eschatologically intense (except for New England Unitarians who grew out of a virtually unperturbed progression from Puritanism to supernatural rationalism and therefore has no strong collective eschatology), and if a few were mortalists, like Priestley, and if almost all the forerunners and runners side by side decreasingly stressed metahistorical election and securely defended free will and the fear and trembling of working out one’s salvation, what had they severally to say about any decisive event in the past, more particularly in the career of Jesus Christ?

Of all the groupings of the radical reformation, apart from occasional individuals, only the Polish Brethren and the Transylvanian Unitarians, and more than half the Italian Anabaptists by 1550, came to regard Jesus Christ as wholly human, though in the thought of most of them he was conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of a Virgin. Among Italian Anabaptists, called Josephites, and some Transylvanian Unitarians in the sixteenth century, Jesus was regarded as the son of both Joseph and Mary.(52) Even in their humanization of Jesus, the Socinians in particular still retained an extraordinarily lofty view of Christ as prophet, priest and King of the universe, entitled to worship. They clarified those passages, particularly in the New Testament, that dealt with the salvific work of Christ and that in various combinations had given rise to a range of interpretations of the work of Christ. These interpretations are commonly classified as one or another of several theories: the theory of the atonement or the theory of redemption, Among the other theories — for Christianity has never Christus Victor, Christ the Exemplar, the theory of the Satisfaction of God’s honor (Anselm)., its modification by Calvin and then by Philip Melanchthon as the Penal theory, and the Governmental Theory of the Remonstrant jurist-theologian Hugo Grotius.(54)

In the sixteenth century, Luther, taking the lead, so much wished to emphasize justification by faith alone in the work of Christ pro nobis that he resisted speculation about the historic Atonement, just
as he stubbornly resisted talking about sanctification. He wished to accept atonement as an historic given and redemption as the experience of forensic justification, assuming that something like sanctification, lest the Protestant movement become implicated again in Catholic works righteousness and preparation for justification. Much more than Luther, he stressed the eternal decree that Christ in the fullness of time should die for a limited number of elect. This was Calvin’s doctrine of limited Atonement.

The radical reformation, until Faustus Socinus in one of the three thrusts of this third major reformation, never produced a treatise on the Atonement, but it surely reacted against the programmatic stress on justification by faith alone. The radicals generally returned to the medieval meaning of justification which incorporated the forensic declaration of justification by grace and the increment of sanctification for which, for example, believers’ baptism prepared one. While never disavowing Anselm or appealing to Peter Abelard (who first in the Middle Ages formulated the Exemplary theory), the radicals in effect followed the early Christians and understood that discipleship meant the imitation of Christ even unto dying with him for their capital offense of rebaptism of accountable baptism, as they thought of it. Besides this, in following the precepts of Christ, they all awaited the imminent vindication at Christ’s Second Advent, a moment in future history which was non-functional in the personal lives of Lutherans, the Reformed, and the Anglicans, no less than the Catholics and the Greek Orthodox.

Thus the fact that Socinus did in De Jesu Christo Servatore develop a theory of the Atonement stands out worthy of mention, all the more because it was the occasion and express target of the Defense of what Grotius in 1617 considered the sole traditional Scriptural, Patristic, Anselmian, Calvinistic doctrine. In a few words: Socinus, holding like all the Reformed in Poland and the Unitarians in particular to the Erasmian idea of the triplex munus Christi as prophet, priest, and king, argued with strange stubbornness (his arguments were largely drawn from the Epistle to the Hebrews) that Christ died on Calvary as Prophet enacting rather than stating his final precept, namely, utter obedience to God the Father. Whereupon, after the forty days of appearances among his followers in the resurrected state, Christ was exalted by God. Thereupon he showed the Father his wounds as eternal High Priest, interceding for his own on earth. There he received as vicar God’s government of the cosmos, of the world, of the nations, and of his Church. In Socinus’s theory of the Atonement, God thought of primarily in voluntarist rather than ontological terms as a loving will in the cosmos, joyfully accepted the obedient Man-Christ — “Thou art my Son; This day have I begotten thee,” Acts 13:33 — as Savior of all who would follow his precepts and be responsive to the heavenly grace.

Socinus did not resort specifically to one of the Pauline and deutero-Pauline theories of the Atonement, reconciliation (katallage), but I am disposed to think that this doctrinally least developed
of all the New Testament explanations of what Christ’s life, teaching, and death could mean played some role in the life and conduct of many in the radical reformation. It largely remained dormant however, until it came into some prominence in the twentieth century of Christianity. In any case, it is clear that the individualistic late nineteenth-century American Unitarian formulation of “salvation by character” has still within it the resonance of a much more earnest and also more cosmic conception of salvation than the phrase, out of the context of sixteenth-century thinking about salvation, would ever suggest. But James Freeman Clarke, ecumenical historian of world religions and Christology, could scarcely have been unaware of the Socinian pedigree of his formulation.

III. CONCLUSION

My exercise has been an historiographical and theological and ethical tour de force. I have tried to place Dr. Wilbur’s three explicit and two implicit marks of liberal religion in the context of the history of Christianity as a whole, with particular reference to those whom Dr. Wilbur regarded as the forerunners of liberal religion, for a group [the Collegium] divided amicably into theologians, ethicists, and church historians.

If any of us were to move more deeply into these historical sources of liberal religion against the background of the history of Christianity, would we have, after all the labor, anything in our hands from which and with which to shape a doctrine of man and his destiny or salvation in terms acceptable to the most traditional and conserving among us? Could we say anything to those among us most disposed to work with the leads of disciplines other than divinity, from physics through psychology, and other realms of experience than religiosity, such as art with its symbolism, music and literature with their vast range of modalities for touching upon and partly clarifying the essence of the human condition, its vagaries and triumphs, if not its destiny? “Taking time seriously,” we imperil the future of the race and that of our fellow creatures on this globe, if we do not take cognizance of the variations of the human condition over three million years, of human evolution and racial and cultural differentiation, of the thousands of years of religious groping and quite plausibly providential tutelage in that quest, and of the four thousand years of our own Judaeo-Christian religious and ethical traditions. Moreover, we must move laterally in our religious inquiry into the nature and destiny of man. We must go beyond our own Judaeo-Christian antecedents, enough at least to understand how differently man is understood in religions other than our own. But of all the world religions, Christianity is the only one which is theologically and symbolically in its initiatory ordinance, baptism, a community of rebirth, rather than a church of one race, class or nation, however much these socio-anthropological realities have featured in Christian history.
The liberal Christian heritage has in it, particularly in America, something of the given church, the gathered sect, and the congeries of mystical seekers (Ernst Troeltsch, slightly modified). And thus liberal religion can draw afresh on any of the sources of our Judaeo-Christian past. And at the same time we have the advantage of calling upon a tradition concerning man grounded in the Old Testament, the New Testament Epoch and thereafter, and in the sixteenth-century radicals who perceived therein the temporally limited character of the life of man, even of Adam before the Fall, a view that comports with that of most Christians today and modern men in general. Yet there was the resurrection event. And modern parapsychological discoveries have come to validate the long suspected scope and depth of human personality, this over against the Judaeo-Christian tradition which has vigorously sought to eliminate all experiences of the parapsychological or at least confine them to manifestations associated with deceased saints and holy places and has at times burned to death persons endowed in special measure with various gifts. (59)

I assume that liberal religion may become open to this suppressed capacity of the mystery that is the brain, personality, the unconscious, the little mysteries of coincidence that all of us have experienced.

And the forerunners of liberal religion throughout almost the whole range of the radical reformation and our Universalist and Unitarian forebears in America have another point in common with the New Testament Epoch and our modern sensibilities, namely the recognition of the complementarity and equality of men and women. In the sixteenth century the Anabaptists, the Spiritualists, and the Evangelical Rationalists recovered for women a place in their churches which they were not to gain in society at large until the nineteenth century. A conspicuously large number of women stand out in the martyrologies of the Anabaptists. In Poland, after the decree of exile in 1660, on pain of conformity or capital punishment, Unitarian women continued to go into the forests to receive communion from Socinian underground pastors and to bring up their children in the faith, while their conforming Catholic husbands turned a blind eye to the awesome law. This feminine Unitarianism continued in Poland until its partition in the eighteenth century and in East Prussia until 1852.

And now to conclude the conclusion!

The liberal in religion today would no be at all satisfied to be wholly a homo spiritualis. He has learned from the homo economicus of Karl Marx, from the homo ratiocinans of Sigmund Freud (the updated version of Luther’s homo simul justus et peccator), and he knows despite all that he is the irrepressible homo ludens in the profoundest and broadest sense of one at play and at leisure from oneself, foundest and broadest sense of one at play and at leisure from oneself, from painting cave
frescoes to sporting in casinos. Moreover, the homo liberalis, our common ideal I presume, is liberal no longer, as in classical antiquity, because he was born free or becomes a freedman, as once a slave was manumitted, but he is liberal or liberted from being merely what he was born genetically, from where he was born, from when he was born. He is liberated by reason of belonging to the community of grace of the reborn in whatever sense, who today will have been able largely to interiorize those moral disciplines which even our religiously liberal forebears felt necessary to make rather prominent in church life. The liberal man is free also because he knows himself to be at once an accountable citizen in society and a responsive subject of the realm of grace. Nor can he as religious, however secular his intellectual environment, abandon the teleological sense of being corporately and personally through the Church in league with a cosmic force tending to overcome evil for all.

However great our sophistication in absorbing the fact that we each are in succession homo naturalis, economicus, ratiocians, spiritualis, liberalis, et ludens, we are each comprehensively a liberal person if we know the ways in which we are at once free and bound failing to understand which and so to act, we not only profess and exercise no religion, which binds in order to free, but we shall also inadvertently slip back in order to free, but we shall also inadvertently slip back as individuals and as societies into a technological totalitarianism. Such a dire finale of human history as well as the fate of our religious and our derivative political liberalism will be determined or escaped to a large extent by the choice we with authentic liberals in several traditions make at the various forks in the road leading toward the twenty-first century global society.

The only organization of mankind now possible, in which free persons and their creative associations and institutions can remain free, is that which, to use the language of Paul Tillich, turns from autonomy to the theonomy of grace. This avoids the ever-lurking possibility of heteronomy, which will surely never be institutionally religious as in phases or episodes or regional expressions in the past of Catholic or Byzantine or Magisterial Protestant Christianity, of Hinduism, Buddhism (Tibetan), and Islam.

It is perhaps more than idealization that move me to observe that the religion from which the first prophets were summoned forth, has never, for all its legalism, failed to be open to these various expressions of grace and liberation and has been essentially theonomous even where it has been largely secularized — so powerful is that prophetic tradition in Israel. No other religious people can, out of so protracted a history of persecution, leading to the Holocaust, give us that most characteristic affirmation L’Chayim (To Life)!
With a passage from one of Israel’s prophets I therefore conclude, well knowing that the Hebrew
nadib, “liberal,” has undergone considerable change in sense and context, and yet be it so: “The lib-
eral man deviseth liberal things, and by liberal things doth he stand” (Isaiah 32:8).
ENDNOTES


2. When I was professor at the Starr King School for the Ministry in Berkeley, 1941–48, and concurrently the successor of Professor George Tolson in the whole field of Church History at the Pacific School of Religion under President Arthur Cushman McGiffert. Jr., I was in due course pressed hard by Dean Rollin Benner to convert my position, at least within Starr King, to comparative religion, even before I had my doctorate. I inherited from my father a concern for the religions. I wrote the brief introduction the 1975 reprint Ten Great Religions: An Essay in Comparative Theology (Boston, 1871), and several articles, which have at least helped me place Christianity or groupings therein into some relationship with other world religions: “The Attitude of Liberals in New England toward Non-Christian Religions, 1784–1873,” Crane Review, IX (Winter 1967), 5989; “Sectarian Ecu-menicity: Reflections on a Little Noted Aspect of the Radical Reformation,” Review and Expositor, LXIV (1967), 141–60; “Erasmus and the Reformers on Non-Christian Religions and Salus extra Ecclesiam,” Essays in Memory of E. Harris Harbison, ed. Theodore K. Rabb and Jerrold E. Seigel (Princeton, 1969), 319–70.


5. My professional career has in fact been influenced by Wilbur and especially seventeen teachers and colleagues: my Catholic high school teacher of German, Marie Antoinette Karp rom Bavaria; Marie Zaleski of Breslau, professor of German, and Charles Lightbody, a Canadian Marxist professor of history, both of the St. Lawrence University, the former largely responsible for my Junior Year at the University of Munich, 193435; James Luther Adams at Meadville Theological School, a factor in my receiving the Cruft Traveling Fellowship for study at the Catholic Institute in Paris and with the two Faculties of Theology at the University of Strasbourg, relocated in Clermont-Ferrand, 193940; Paul Tillich, whose writings in German were the basis of my B.D. thesis on sin in his theology (little did I know!); Wilhelm Pauck at the University of Chicago, who said in the classroom for all to hear: “As a born Unitarian you will never be able to understand the doctrine of the Trinity”, Jules Lebreton, S.J., of the Catholic Institute; Jean Herig, phenomenologist, New Testament scholar, and ethicist at the University of Strasbourg; Ernst Kantorowicz, medievalist, exile from Nazi Germany at the University of California at Berkeley; John C. Bennett and James Muilenberg as senior colleagues at Pacific School of Religion; Professor Reinhold Niebuhr and Professor John T. McNeill (especially as of Union Theological Seminary); and as junior or mostly older colleagues and associates with whom I have sustained close contacts after becoming myself a professor at Harvard (1947): Heiko Augustinus Oberman, James Luther Adams again, Harry Austryn Wolfson, the very Rev. Professor Georges Florovsky, who fostered an already developed interest in Eastern Orthodoxy, John Courtney Murray, S.J., and Roland Bainton of Yale. I could add an even larger list of students whose influence on me has been considerable, undergraduate and graduate.

My Commencement Address, Regis College, Weston, Massachusetts, June 14, 1964, was my tribute to Marie Karp, a lay Catholic who went ahead of her ecclesiastical superiors. Although loyal to her Church, she was present at my first sermon (preached in the Unitarian Church, Rochester, New York, 1939) by the flowers she placed in her name in the chancel. My B.D. thesis was entitled “Sin in the Theology of Paul Tillich,” but as I found no sense of personal sin, I converted it into a discussion of corporate alienation, printed in summary in my first serious publication, “Priest Prophet and Protestant: A Study in the Theology of Paul Tillich,” Journal of Liberal Religion, I (1940); subsequently reprinted in The Protestant Digest, III, 6 (JuneJuly, 1940). I have acknowledged my indebtedness to James Luther Adams in several places, inter alia, “Tribute to James Luther Adams” [originally with John Coleman Bennett], Godbox, No. 3 (Winter 19[67]/68); “James Luther Adams,” Andover Newton Quarterly, XVI (Fall 1976). Also see my “The Philosophy of the Church Fathers by Harry Austryn Wolfson; A Review Article,” Church History XXVI (June 1957); “Harry Wolfson as Stylist,” Tributes to Harry Wolfson on the Occasion of His Seventy-Fifth birthday, Mosaic, IV (Winter 1963); “Georges Vasilievich Florovsky,” Greek Orthodox Theological Review, XI (Summer 1965);

6. In this I am following a suggestion of my colleague C. Conrad Wright, who thought there would be interest in noting what had once stirred or drew me to write on such a range of topics.


9. He had received his B.A. from the University of Vermont in 1886, and he was honored there with the S.T.D. in 1910.

10. The other blow was the defalcation of about half the endowment of his School, the take over of the building by right of eminent domain by the University of California, and the beginning of the protracted but substantial attrition of his incomparable Unitariana. His own personal Unitariana were left to Harvard Divinity School, for the development of which he personally presented a substantial check to President Nathan M. Pusey in Massachusetts Hall, a nostalgic and doubly poignant ceremony at which I was privileged to be present with Mrs. Wilbur.

11. I was myself honored by the Universalists to present the bicentennial commemorative history, which I dedicated to my mother, whose paternal grandparents in the Western Reserve of Ohio and their ancestors in Connecticut and Massachusetts had been Universalists from far back, see American Universalism (Boston, 1976).

12. I am a fourth generation minister. My father, David Rhys Williams, S.T.B. from Harvard Divinity School and Andover Theological Seminary, 1913, was a Congregationalist minister successively in Norfolk and Edgartown, Mass., and in the North Congregational Church in Cleveland, Ohio, where he also ran a forum in the church which was later moved to downtown Cleveland. In 1924 he became minister of the Third Unitarian Church in Chicago (Austin). He then became minister and minister emeritus in Rochester, 1924–70. I was glad to find that the first professor of Church history at Harvard, Frederic Hedge, later professor of German also, later still President of the American Unitarian Association, had come to think broadly of the complementary validities of four thrusts in Christian history which he brought somewhat imaginatively under the headings Christianity of the North, the South, the East, and the West. See my Rethinking the Unitarian Relationship with Protestantism: An Examination of the Thought of Frederic Henry Hedge (1805–1890) (Boston, 1949). Hedge was interested in Episcopalianism under Tractarian liturgical influence, but he did not surrender his close Unitarian friend Frederic D. Huntington, who in the end became Episcopalian Bishop of Western New York. I have long felt heir to both lines of the New England Puritan tradition.

13. My paper at the Society of Renaissance Research Conference in Hungary in May 1979, commemorating the death of Francis Dávid, is “The Issue Between Francis Dávid and Faustus Socinus in 1569.”


15. Socinus always said that baptism was a superseded rite except for converts from Islam or Judaism, but his chief reason was that Christ’s Gospel was received during the wilderness experience in heaven after his baptism by John.

This Library was the residual legatee of an enormous project of selecting major texts to be translated for use in the China mission. When China became Communist, the more modest plan was conceived and appropriately altered. Dr. McNeill thought of my doing primarily Hans Denck and Mergal, Juan de Valdes. Dr. McNeil had a very strong conviction that a scholar in any confessional tradition bore an abiding responsibility toward it and influenced me by reminding me of what he considered an obligation. However, as a consistent though benignant Calvinist, he and the coeditors were adamant that nothing from Roland Bainton’s Left Wing of the Reformation could be included among “Christian Classics”! I accepted the proffer on condition that I could control two-thirds of the volume, devote it to Anabaptists and Spiritualists of several kinds, including Menno Simons, and that I could at least list the works of the Evangelical Rationalists as of that date available in English. Out of this came, then, my Spiritual and Anabaptist Writers, ed. with Angel M. Mergal, The Library of Christian Classics XXV (Philadelphia, 1957); and further research which led to “Studies in the Radical Reformation (1517–1618): A Bibliographical Survey of research Since 1939,” Church History, XXVII (March and June 1958), 46–69, 125–60. I decided in the process to write the Radical Reformation, which I did in virtually a year and a half at Harvard, on leave and on a grant from the Lilly Foundation. As an extra proof that anabaptism was not confined to Germanic peoples I wrote “Anabaptism and Spiritualism in the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: An Obscure Phase of the PreHistory of Socinianism,” Studia nad Arianizmem, ed. Ludwik Chmaj (Warsaw, 1959), 215–62; and much later “Camillo Renato c. 1500– c. 1575,” Italian Reformation Studies in Honor of Laelius Socinus (1562–1962), University of Siena, Collana di Studi Pietro Rossi, IV (Florence, 1965), 103–83/95, also in The Proceedings of the Unitarian Historical Society, XIV, Parts I and II (1962–63); and “Two Social Strands in Italian Anabaptism c. 1550,” The Social History of the Reformation: In Honor of Harold J. Grimm, ed. Lawrence P. Buck and Jonathan W. Zophy (Columbus, Ohio, 1972), 156–207.


18. That Arianism as it evolved could more easily accommodate and subordiate the Church to the Christianized Empire is one theme in my “Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century,” Church History XX (September and December, 1951), 3–33, 3–26; and “The Golden Priesthood and the Leaden State,” Ricerche di Storia Religiosa (1957), 291–310, which also appears in Harvard Theological Review, L (1957), 37–64.


24. My doctoral dissertation at Union Theological Seminary, New York, 1946, was a study of a unique codex of thirty-one documents dealing largely with the antiGregorian polemic at its very best and in attractive christological context. The argument of the documents, however, subordinated the bishop, as representative of the earthly Christ in his human nature, to the duke of Normandy or King of England representative of the divine nature of the glorified Christ. I came close to identifying the author as Archbishop William Bona Anima of Rouen, who as the son of a priest was existentially involved in opposing the arguments of Gregory VII Hildebrand for clerical celibacy, but I had to be content to call the thesis, and some hitherto unpublished minor tracts from the codex, The Norman Anonymous of 1100 A.D.: Toward the Identification and Evaluation of the So-Called Anonymous of York, Harvard Theological Studies, XVIII (Cambridge, 1951).


29. A popular mysticism, in fact, came to be found among certain groupings or individuals of all the


32. This is a passage from Sermon #722, “The World’s Fair from Above,” preached by Jenkin Lloyd Jones at All Souls Church in Chicago, 15 October, 1893, and summarized effectively in the Colloquium paper by Professor Tom Graham printed in this volume of Proceedings.

33. This subtitle picks up a principle I set forth in “American Critical Pluralism in the Emerging Middle Ground in Interfaith Relations” (Boston, 1954).


35. Unitarians were excluded from the provisions of the Henrician Articles and the Warsaw Confederation of 1572 in 1658 and obliged to leave the Commonwealth, convert to Catholicism, or suffer
death. All other confessions, however, preserved corporate religious liberty until the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century.

36. My first public appearance in the Harvard community was in a debate on state support for parochial education. I supported the position of Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam, and I used the much appreciated phrase “no taxation without salvation.” See Public Aid to Parochial Education: Presented by the Harvard Law School Forum, Addresses by George H. Williams, Vincent McGrossen, G. Bromley Oxnam, and James N. O’Neill (Cambridge, 1951). But I have come to see in the Catholic Church, especially since Vatican II, the possibilities for an immensely significant contribution to defining man and mankind and to upholding individual and group civil liberties on a global scale. See below, note 39.

37. The above is drawn from my Polish Brethren, loc. cit.


I have strongly supported the State of Israel and both before and after the Six-Day War took a public stand. I sent fifty-two letters, defending the right of Israel to retain militarily unarmed Jerusalem (mixed municipal constabulary only) and made several other important proposals: to the Pope, the Secretary of the World Council of Churches, the foreign ministers of several Middle Eastern states, all Jewish Senators, and many more. A summary of my proposals is in a footnote to That All The Peoples of the Earth May Know Thy Name. With these credentials and more I feel free to say that the more prophetic and religious sector particularly in American Jewry must come theatologically, ethically and constitutionally to grips with a problem of double political loyalty that was once charged by the Know-Nothing Party against immigrant Catholics. This strain in American public life persisted until the election of John F. Kennedy and the prominence of American Catholics, like Daniel and Philip Berrigan, in opposition to the American policy toward Vietnam.

39. I have dealt with the Catholic Church since 1870 in “Loyalty and Dissent in the Church in Historical Perspective,” America, CXXII (27 June 1970), 669–71; and at the end of “Omnium Christia-


41. Clerical salaries are paid, wholly or in part, in most socialist-bloc countries by the government, except in the Soviet Union itself. Throughout the bloc the other restrictions hold except that in Poland and Rumania public liturgical processions are, on request, routinely granted; but all religious bodies are licensed and registered as with the religiones licitae of the Roman Empire. Christians often allowed themselves to be incorporated as licit in one aspect of the common life only, as sodalities for the burial of the dead.

42. See my “The Plight of Russian Orthodoxy,” loc. cit.


44. Since my views on abortion are so different from those of mainline Protestant leadership, not to say those of almost all Unitarian Universalists, I feel the need to say first of all that my father was the first to open a birth control clinic in Gannett House, the large parish hall of the Unitarian Church of Rochester. By this act, he lost as members several physicians and their families because of the immense pressure they were under from their Catholic colleagues. When my father for his eightieth birthday was given the whole picture page and the lead article of the local newspaper, in answer to the interviewer’s question as to what he regarded as the single most important act of his ministry, he said without hesitation, the opening of that much contested clinic. I myself was made chairman
by Governor John Volpe in 1965 of the special and absolutely balanced commission to advise the
legislature on altering the laws forbidding the sale of contraceptives. At the time I urged the Catholic
members to look ahead to the, for me, quite different issue of abortion.

My convictions about abortion are both civil libertarian and personal rather than religious. I was
president of Americans United for Life from its incorporation in Washington, D.C. in 1970 until
1978. The organization, at my urging, helped pay the expenses of the visit of the President of the
Supreme Constitutional Court of the German Federal Republic at Karlsruhe. Dr. Ernst Benda, on his
lecture tour to several American campuses. Both the majority and minority opinions of his court had
held that intentional abortion was manslaughter. I have written on the subject in “The No. 2 Moral
Issue of Today,” America, CXVI, No. 12 (March 1967), 452f.; “Religious Residues and Presup-
positions in the American Debate on Abortion,” Theological Studies, XXXI (March 1970), 10–75;
“The Sacred Condominium,” The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, ed. John
Noonan, Jr. (Cambridge, 1970), 14671; “Protecting the Unborn,” Statement before the House Judi-
ciary Committee, Boston, The Boston Traveler (25 February 1971), 7; “Creatures of a Creator, Mem-
ners of a Body, Subjects of a Kingdom,” To God Be the Glory: Sermons in Honor of George Arthur
Buttrick, ed. Theodore Gill (Nashville/New York, 1973), 98–108 (a sermon in Memorial Church,
at the conclusion of which I was slapped in the face by a woman); “The Democratization of a Near
Constant in [Christian] History,” forward to Abortion and Social Justice, ed. Thomas W. Hilgers and

I was confident that the Supreme Court would eventually construe the unborn child as a person as it,
after the Civil War, raised the male slave from 3/5 of a man for the purpose of calculating representa-
tives of white males from the slave states in Congress. I was in Poland on a Guggenheim Fellowship
when the decision of the United States Supreme Court of 22 January 1973 stared at me from the
front page. I had always argued against my often one-issue and otherwise conservative to reactionary
pro-life associates that the Court would have carried to its logical conclusion the great affirmation
“that all men are created equal.” My stand on this issue has been all the harder for my being also an
ardent conservationist of wild life and the wilderness area. See “Ecology and Abortion,” New Eng-
land Sierran, III, No. 6 (July/August 1972), 2, 6.

45. See Wilderness and Paradise; and “Christian Attitudes toward Nature,” loc. cit.

46. I am personally a pacifist. I believe also in the propriety of the exemption of clerics and physi-
cians from violating something fundamental in their calling— for the good of society no less then
of the communities of faith. I believe that the word “conscientious” should be applied both to the
pacifist and the heart-torn participant and I believe also in the right, in a democracy, in certain cir-
cumstances, of being conscientiously selective in opposition to an unjust war or “unjust” acts in
warfare. I have written on war, the right of asylum, and the chaplaincy in “An Unjust War,” Articles
Historical Perspective,” Perspectives (April 1968), 40–76; The Religious Situation: 1969, ed. Donald

47. I have traced Sabbatarianism, with a present-day interfaith proposal, in “The Sabbath and the Lord’s Day,” loc. cit.


50. See “Joseph Priestly on Luther,” loc cit.


52. See “Two Social Strands in Italian Anabaptism,” loc. cit.

53. See my Anselm: Communion and Atonement (St. Louis, 1960).


56. I have long regarded baptism as a profound but neglected ordinance. I have written about it in several contexts, from ancient to modern, not only in the Radical Reformation, etc., but also in Anselm: Communion and Atonement; “A Homily for Communion,” The Unitarian Christian, XXIV (Spring 1968), 14, 16; “The Baptismal Theology and Practice in Rome Reflected in Justine Martyr,” The Ecumenical World of Orthodox Civilization: Essays in Honor of Georges Florovsky, three volumes, ed. Thomas Bird and Andrew Blane (Mouton Press, 1974), III, 9–34.

57. I have developed the triplex munus theme in Wilderness and Paradise; and in “Erasmianism in Poland, 1518–1605,” Polish Review, XXII (1977), 3–50.
58. Reconciliation is the last topic in my extensive, convoluted study in which Georges Sorel is dealt with centrally, “Four Modalities of Violence,” loc. cit.

59. My only excursion into the history of one of these parapsychological phenomena is in “A History of Speaking in Tongues and Related Gifts,” with Edith Lydia Waldvogel, The Charismatics: Confusion or Blessing, ed. canon Michael Hamilton (Grand Rapids, 1975), 61–112: but I am interested in many others, experientially and historically.